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Financial Sector Supervision in Ukraine: 
Would an Integrated Supervisor Help? 
Executive Summary 
Following international trends to integrate financial sector supervision authorities, 
Ukraine considers the possibility of integrating two supervisory authorities, the State 
Commission for the Regulation of Financial Markets and the State Commission for 
Securities and the Stock Market. While we agree in principle that an integration of 
supervision has some appeal, we do not expect any positive effect in the case of Ukraine. 
The most pressing problems of financial sector supervision in Ukraine, namely the lack of 
qualified employees, the lack of appropriate capital goods, the lack of political support for 
supervisors and a frequently varying institutional framework of supervision, will not be 
solved. On the contrary, some of these problems will increase. In fact, we expect a 
significant worsening of financial sector supervision. Consequently, we strongly advise 
the Ukrainian Government to postpone the plans to integrate the two commissions until 
the most pressing problems of financial sector supervision are solved. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a broad consensus that prudential financial supervision is a major requirement 
for a stable and efficient financial sector. Over the last years, a number of countries have 
decided to move towards an integration of their financial market supervision authorities. 
Major driving forces behind these developments are the increasing role of financial 
conglomerates with activities in different financial industries. 
This discussion has also been held in Ukraine. The Cabinet of Ministers’ Programme 
“Towards the Needs of People” adopted by the Tymoshenko Government envisioned an 
element of integration of the different financial sector supervision authorities in Ukraine. 
By unifying two commissions – the commission for the insurance market and the 
commission for the stock market – the supervision of financial markets in Ukraine was 
intended to be improved. The former Minister of Economy Mr. Teriohin also proposed to 
create an integrated supervisor for financial markets. However, the proposals did not 
meet enthusiasm on the side of market participants and the affected commissions. Many, 
amongst them the League of Insurance Organisations, the Commission for the Regulation 
of Financial Markets, and the Commission for Securities, agreed that a unified supervisor 
might be reasonable in the long-run. But creating a single authority at this stage was not 
considered as opportune by everyone. Some even fear that integrating the authorities 
might harm the development of the Ukrainian financial sector. For example, the Minister 
of Finance, Mr Pynzenyk, called for a postponement of integration for an undefined 
period. But notwithstanding this declaration, the new government under Prime Minister 
Yehanurov is likely to reconsider plans for the integration of financial supervisors. 
As explained in more detail below, we believe that financial sector supervision in Ukraine 
faces a number of very serious problems. In view of these urgent problems, the 
discussion on the integration of financial supervisors looks rather misplaced and artificial. 
But as the debate has already been opened, this paper shall contribute to the discussion 
by analysing the impact integration would have on the most pressing problems of 
financial supervision in Ukraine. 
This policy paper is structured as follows. Part 2 of this paper discusses the general 
rationale for and against an integrated financial supervisor. The third part identifies the 
main problems of the current financial supervision in Ukraine. Part 4 analyses the likely 
effects integration would have by taking country specifics into consideration. Concluding, 
Part 5 provides policy recommendations. 
2. The rationale for and against an integrated financial sector 
supervision 
Before analysing the suitability of an integrated agency for Ukraine, the subsequent 
paragraphs will outline those advantages and disadvantages of such an agency regularly 
mentioned in the economic literature and shall describe international experiences with 
integrated supervisors. 
2.1. Benefits 
The following benefits are attributed to an integrated supervisor and have led to several 
countries moving towards this form of organising financial sector supervision: 
i) Enablement of financial conglomerate supervision 
Financial conglomerates have recently gained importance. Their diverse activities require 
that the risk of the group to be assessed on a consolidated basis. An integrated 
supervisor can ensure supervision free of gaps. 
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ii) Competitive neutrality 
The boundaries between financial products and services have increasingly blurred. Banks, 
insurance and securities firms compete in the same market for the same customer. 
Different regulations or requirements of information may lead to comparative advantages 
for one industry. An integrated supervisor may prevent regulatory arbitrage and ensure a 
level playing field. 
iii) Regulatory flexibility 
An integrated regulatory agency is likely to adapt faster to new challenges (development 
of new financial products or financial institutions). If multiple specialised supervisors 
exist, doubts about jurisdiction or rivalry may prevent effective ways of response. 
iv) Enhancement of efficiency (economies of scale) 
Creating an integrated authority can reduce operating costs. This was one of the 
strongest arguments for small economies or countries with small financial sectors to unify 
their agencies. In addition, communicating and sharing relevant information is easier, 
especially when co-operating internationally. 
v) Improvement of accountability 
The existence of multiple supervisors can lead to difficulties in holding the regulators to 
account for their performance, as overlapping responsibilities make it possible to blame 
the other supervisor for one’s own failures, thus making it difficult to hold any of the 
supervisors responsible. However, this argument is not particularly strong as it does not 
hold if the individual supervisor’s objectives are clearly specified. 
It should be mentioned, that the benefits are considered to be largest when banking and 
insurance supervisors join. Convergence of financial intermediaries (for example at the 
distributional level) is highest between banks and insurers, this being the reason why the 
French term “bancassurance” is often used to describe these linkages. Germany’s largest 
financial conglomerate – Allianz AG – emerged when the insurer Allianz acquired 
Dresdner Bank AG. 
2.2 Drawbacks 
Integrating supervision authorities can also have major drawbacks: 
i) Unclear objectives 
An integrated authority may have trouble balancing between the different objectives of 
regulation and might not be able to adequately differentiate between different types of 
institutions. Occasionally conflicts of interest may arise. 
ii) Diseconomies of scale 
The integration may also lead to an agency that is effectively a regulatory monopoly. This 
might cause a rise of inefficiencies. For example, a monopoly supervisor may be more 
rigid and bureaucratic than separate agencies. 
iii) Regulatory capture 
Creating a single integrated supervisor could facilitate corruption for market participants 
operating in different sectors. After all, bribing many supervisors can be more difficult 
than bribing only one. 
iv) Creation of a “Leviathan” 
Creating a large and powerful integrated supervisor may lead to the development of a 
“mighty bully, a bureaucratic leviathan divorced from the industry it regulates”.  
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v) Limited synergies 
Some argue that synergy gains are not very large. For example, risks for banks are on 
the asset side while those of insurances are on the liabilities side.  
vi) Moral hazard 
The public may assume that all financial institutions will be granted similar protection 
after integration. Without integration, the perception is more differentiated. This 
argument against integration is particularly troublesome if all authorities are united 
within a nation’s central bank, as this institution may have bailed out or is perceived to 
be willing to support troubled banks. 
Box 1 
International experiences with integrating supervision authorities 
Integrated financial supervision was first installed in Scandinavia. Norway established the 
first integrated supervisor in 1986, followed by Denmark and Sweden in 1988 and 1991. 
Since then a number of countries have followed suit, amongst them a number of 
European countries. Next to the United Kingdom, some of the new EU member states 
have also created consolidated supervisors at the end of the last decade. Germany 
followed in 2002. 
The overall experience is positive. None of those countries that have established an 
integrated agency have faced a noteworthy discussion to disintegrate the agency. 
However, a tendency to have been assigned additional tasks even though this may 
distract from the original function has arisen in some countries (occasionally labelled as 
the “Christmas-tree effect”). For example, some integrated authorities have been 
assigned to also regulate real-estate brokers. It is less likely that these would have been 
assigned to traditional specialised supervisors. 
An international survey conducted by the World Bank in 2003 indicates that the overall 
positive experience crucially depends on a comprehensive plan and strong managerial 
skills within the new agency. It is important to note, too, that integrated supervision is a 
very recent phenomenon. Its long-term effectiveness still remains to be proven. 
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Table 1 
Fully or partially integrated financial supervisors in Selected European Countries* 
Country Name of Agency 
Year of 
Establishment 
Intermediaries supervised by 
the agency 
Austria Finanzmarktaufsicht (FMA) 2002 
Banks, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs1 
Denmark 
Danish Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FINANSTILSYNET) 
1988 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Estonia 
Financial Supervision Authority 
(FSA) 
1999 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Germany 
Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungs-aufsicht 
(BaFin) 
2002 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Hungary 
Hungarian Financial 
Supervision Authority (HFSA) 
2000 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Latvia 
Financial and Capital Market 
Commission 
1998 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Luxembourg 
Commission de Surveillance du 
Secteur Financier 
1999 Banking, Securities 
Malta Malta Financial Services Centre 2002 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Norway Kredittilsynet 1986 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
Slovakia 
Financial Market Authority 
(FMA) 
2002 Securities, Insurance 
Sweden Finansinspektionen 1990 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
United 
Kingdom 
Financial Supervision Authority 
(FSA) 
1997 
Banking, Securities, Insurance, 
other NBFIs 
* Comprises agencies supervising at least two types of financial intermediaries. 
Source: José de Luna Martinez and Thomas A. Rose, International Survey of Integrated Financial Sector 
Supervision, World Bank Policy Research Paper 3096, July 2003; national agencies websites. 
3. Ukrainian financial supervision and its problems 
The prudential regulation and supervision of financial institutions in Ukraine is executed 
by separate state bodies responsible for regulation: The National Bank of Ukraine 
regulates commercial banks; the State Commission for Regulation of Financial Services 
Markets (hereafter – the Financial Services Commission) – the insurance market, non-
state pension funds, crediting institutions (credit unions, leasing companies) and financial 
companies; the State Commission for Securities and Stock Market (hereafter – the 
Securities Commission) – all capital markets participants. In this paper we focus mainly 
on the activities of the two commissions, which perform regulation over non-banking 
institutions, since the discussion regarding the prospects for the creation of an integrated 
financial supervisory authority over Ukraine’s financial market concerns exactly these two 
organs.  
The Financial Services Commission is a very young and inexperienced institution. It was 
created in late 2002 soon after the Law of Ukraine on Financial Services and Regulation 
of Financial Markets was adopted. The Financial Services Commission unites the Head of 
                                                 
1  NBFI refers to non-bank financial institutions. 
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the commission, three Deputies of the Head and at least three commission’s members – 
usually the Heads of the departments. The decisions are reached based on the collective 
voting with each voter provided equally with one voice. The President of Ukraine appoints 
the Head and the members; however, the Head is personally responsible for all the 
decisions adopted by the commission. As of January 1st 2005 238 people were employed 
in the Financial Services Commission, 177 of which worked for the central office. Most of 
the employees have completed economic education (almost 60%); others received 
juridical and humanitarian degrees (30%). The only source of finances for the 
commission’s activity is State Budget funding. 
The Financial Services Commission sharply lacks political and financial support required 
to fulfil its important monitoring tasks. At present, it does not even have the necessary 
resources to set up a basic IT-based record of insurers’ capital movements. Its Head is 
unable to hire and train insurance experts at competitive salaries leading to high 
turnover of its employees: people start working in the commission, learn specifics of the 
financial services markets and then leave for positions in the private sector. It also lacks 
the political power to withdraw licenses or force mergers and takeovers if financing or 
management is insufficient. The lack of state support for the commission leads to the 
execution of its supervisory assignment in a very difficult environment.  
Very similar problems relate to the regulator over the stock market in Ukraine – the 
Securities Commission, which was created in 1995. The Securities Commission has 26 
local offices and one central office. It employed more than 600 people at end of 2004, 
98% of which have completed higher education. The only source of finances for the 
commission’s activity is State Budget funding. Inadequate funding has become a 
particularly acute problem in recent years. Its hardware and software, to a greater extent 
introduced just after its creation, have completely depreciated. The need to create a 
unique modern informational system is particularly pressing. Without sufficient financing 
and political will the ability of the Securities Commission to exert effective supervision 
becomes questionable. 
From all the above mentioned, the major problems impeding the development of 
adequate financial supervision in Ukraine are the following:  
1. A lack of qualified employees and low level of salaries;  
2. A lack of appropriate capital goods (especially software);  
3. A lack of political support from the Parliament and questionable true 
independence of the regulative activities;  
4. A frequently varying institutional framework of supervision. 
Since supervision is particularly important in the first stages of market development, 
finding solutions to the discussed problems should not be postponed further but tackled 
as soon as possible. 
4. Would integrating the insurance and securities supervisors be 
beneficial for Ukraine? 
In Part 4.1 we move the general debate on benefits and drawbacks of integrated 
supervision as described in Part 2 into the Ukrainian context. In Part 4.2 we confront the 
plans of integration with the most pressing problems of Ukraine’s financial supervision as 
described in Part 3 and ask whether integration would help to improve the current 
situation. 
4.1 Benefits and drawbacks of an integrated supervision in the Ukrainian context 
Many countries in the European Union have merged their supervision authorities to 
enable financial conglomerate supervision and to ensure competitive neutrality. This has 
been the major driving force. As Ukraine’s financial sector so far does not show any 
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substantial development of financial conglomerates, these benefits do not apply. Besides, 
even if financial conglomerates did exist, they would still not be supervised on a 
consolidated basis. After all, the merger proposal does not include banking sector 
supervision. For this reason, there is also little to be gained by regulatory flexibility 
through an integrated supervisor. Some advantage can be seen in an improvement of 
accountability, but - once again - as banking supervision remains outside of the merged 
authority, this advantage is limited. One remaining advantage may prove to be beneficial 
in the long-run. Some gains of efficiency can be expected. However, these economies of 
scale will not accrue in the short or medium term, as financial sector supervision in 
Ukraine is currently dramatically understaffed. Summing up the benefits, only very 
limited synergy gains can be realised in the long-run. 
The drawbacks, however, will immediately be felt by policy makers and market 
participants alike. There is a high risk that the new authority will not be sure about its 
objectives in the first years. In addition, there is a substantial threat that a newly created 
supervisor of the insurance and capital markets will facilitate corruption. Firstly, the 
supervisor’s staff may use the likely disarray of the change process to extract bribes. 
Secondly, a larger supervisor covering two sectors will find this easier, as one supervisor 
is easier to bribe than two. 
Summing up, most benefits generally associated with an integrated supervisor will not 
materialise in Ukraine if the proposed merger is followed through. However, the risks 
involved are high. 
4.2 The impact of integration on current problems of financial sector supervision 
 
Besides these general considerations, the following will analyse the impact that a merger 
of the two commissions will have on those problems Ukraine’s financial sector supervision 
faces today. 
1) Lack of qualified employees 
In Ukraine, „restructuring“ is often understood and implemented as a liquidation of 
former institutions and a complete build up of a new institution. In the case of the two 
commissions in question, a number of employees who have acquired substantial skills 
and experience in the past will leave the institution. Some will be fired, others, especially 
the most qualified employees, will leave the institutions voluntarily. As mentioned earlier, 
the supervisory authorities invest heavily into their staff. But as an integrated labour 
market exists, private financial institutions hire the authorities’ staff once they are highly 
qualified. The risk is high that this problem will increase in the uncertainty of a merger 
process. 
Result of integration (1): Negative. 
It is very likely that this problem is one reason why the initial proposal to unify the 
financial supervision authorities only included the Financial Services Commission and the 
Securities Commission. Theoretically, a new unified supervisor might also be responsible 
for banking supervision. As Table 1 indicates, this has been a very common approach for 
supervision reform in other countries. But uniting all three authorities in Ukraine would 
have been even more problematic. As a rule, the employees of the National Bank of 
Ukraine, the current banking supervisor, have better working conditions and a higher 
status than those at a purely supervisory institution. The fear of loosing very capable 
employees to other institutions might have been high. 
2) Lack of appropriate capital goods (especially software) 
Most likely, an integrated supervisor would not bring about any changes to the better in 
this area. In contrast, in the short term some minor problems during the transformation 
phase (due to the harmonisation of systems, relocation, etc.) might prove difficult. As the 
timely and effective data collection and data processing is crucial for supervisors, the 
issue of adequate technological resources is to be considered of utmost importance for 
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improving the supervision of the financial sector. But it is not relevant for the decision of 
the appropriate organisation of the sector’s supervision. 
Result of integration (2): Neutral. 
3) Lack of political support and independency 
In general, creating a larger and more important institution may increase this institutions 
political influence. This would – at first sight – suggest that unifying the Financial 
Services and the Securities Commission would lead to a higher degree of independence. 
However, vested interests of financial institutions in Parliament are very strong and it is 
questionable if a stronger, consolidated supervisor can change this situation. Thus, a 
noteworthy positive effect on this issue can not be expected from unification. 
Result of integration (3): Neutral. 
4) Continuous changing of the institutional framework 
The two commissions have only recently been created (1995 and 2002). To improve and 
develop their full potential, institutions need time. As long as major organisational 
changes occur, the institutions will be busy with reorganising themselves and will bind 
resources needed to fulfil their actual purpose. This has prevented prudential supervision 
in the past. More reorganisation without enough time for the commissions to settle will 
worsen the state of financial sector supervision in Ukraine. 
Result of integration (4): Negative. 
Considering the impact of integration on the four major problems of Ukrainian 
supervision, one can expect a deterioration of two of these problems. A change to the 
better is not to be expected for any of these. The expected benefits generally associated 
with the integration of specialised financial sector supervision authorities will be too small 
to outweigh the significant negative effects.  
5. Conclusions and recommendations 
As described, financial sector supervision in Ukraine faces a number of significant 
problems. These problems seriously threaten the stability of the financial sector and 
impair financial intermediation in Ukraine, with consequences for economic development 
and social considerations. The planned integration of financial supervisors will not solve 
any of the major problems the Ukrainian supervisors face today. On the contrary, the 
situation is likely to worsen for an undefined period. In addition, the benefits generally 
attributed to integration are expected to be marginal in the case of Ukraine, as the 
proposed merger only includes the insurance sector and capital market supervision. 
Therefore, we recommend postponing unification of the supervision authorities until the 
existing supervision agencies have solved those problems that are currently most 
pressing. 
Conclusion 1: Postpone integrating Ukraine’s financial supervision in order not to 
worsen the situation. 
In the short and medium term, the following more basic measures should be taken to 
improve prudential supervision: 
• Improve working conditions including salaries to prevent skilled and experienced 
personnel to leave for financial institutions that require similar qualification 
• Increase state funding and/or introduce partial funding through market 
participants2 
                                                 
2  This is common in other European countries. For example, Germany’s BaFin and the United 
Kingdom’s FSA are fully funded through a levy on the firms they regulate, budget funds are not 
used at all. This enables the authority to pay higher salaries than other public sector authorities. 
Thus, the authority’s ability to compete with private financial sector institutions on the job-market 
is improved. 
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• Improve technical infrastructure, especially through investments into software 
• Facilitate the exchange of information between the supervisors (institutionalised 
regular meetings, sharing of harmonised information) to improve the ability to 
supervise financial conglomerates 
Conclusion 2: Focus on the fundamental problems and improve supervision capacity. 
Apart from improving the situation of the supervision authorities it is crucial to increase 
the transparency of Ukraine’s financial sector. Currently, transparency is very limited and 
dramatically impairs effective financial sector supervision. A separate forthcoming 
advisory paper will address this crucial issue.  
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